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Williamson Murray graduated from Yale University in 1963 with 
honors in history. He then served five years as an officer in the 
United States Air Force, including a tour in Southeast Asia with 
the 314th Tactical Airlift Wing (C-130s). He returned to Yale 
University where he received his Ph.D. in military-diplomatic 
history, working under Hans Gatzke and Donald Kagan. He 
taught two years in the Yale history department before moving 
on to Ohio State University in fall 1977 as a military and 
diplomatic historian. Together with Allan R. Millett, he co-founded 
the OSU Military History Program. He received the Alumni 
Distinguished Teaching Award in 1987. He took early retirement 
from Ohio State in 1995 as Professor Emeritus of History.  
Murray has taught at a number of other institutions, including the 
Air War College, the United States Military Academy, and the 
Naval War College. He has also served as a Secretary of the Navy 
Fellow at the Navy War College, the Centennial Visiting Professor 
at the London School of Economics, the Matthew C. Horner 
Professor of Military Theory at the Marine Corps University, the 
Charles Lindbergh Chair at the Smithsonian's Air and Space 
Museum, and the Harold K. Johnson Professor of Military History 
at the Army War College. He is currently a Senior Fellow at the 
Institute of Defense Analysis and a member of the National 
Strategic Studies Group.  
Murray has written a wide selection of articles and books. He is 
the author of The Change in the European Balance of Power, 
1938-1939, The Path to Ruin (Princeton University Press, 1984); 
Luftwaffe (Nautical and Aviation Press, 1985); German Military 
Effectiveness (Nautical and Aviation Press, 1992); The Air War in 
the Persian Gulf (Nautical and Aviation Press, 1995); and Air 
War, 1914-1945 (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1999). He has 
edited with Allan Millett a number of books on the implications of 
the past for current military thinking, including Military 
Effectiveness, three volumes (Allen and Unwin, 1988); 
Calculations, Net Assessment and the Coming of World War II 
(Free Press, 1992); and Military Innovations in the Interwar 
Period (Cambridge, 1996). Murray has also edited, with 
MacGregor Knox, The Making of Strategy, Rulers, States, and 
War (Cambridge University Press, 1994) and The Dynamics of 
Military Revolution, 1300-2050 (Cambridge, University Press, 
2001). Murray and Millett have published (May 2000) an 
operational history of World War II, A War To Be Won, Fighting 
the Second World War (Harvard University Press), which already 
has received rave reviews from a number of newspapers and 
journals, including The Wall Street Journal, The Times Literary 
Supplement, The Naval War College Review, The Journal of 
Military History, and Strategic Review. Murray's most recent 
book, The Iraq War, A Military History (Harvard University Press, 
2003), written with Major General Robert Scales, Jr., has also 
received excellent reviews.  
Some of Murray's most recently published articles include 
“Clausewitz Out, Computer In, Military Culture and Technological 
Hubris,” The National Interest , Summer 1997; “Air War in the 
Persian Gulf: The Limits of Air Power,” Strategic Review, Winter 
1998; “Preparing to Lose the Next War?,” Strategic Review, Fall 
1998; “Does Military Culture Matter?,” Orbis, Winter 1999; “The 
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 Emerging Strategic Environment, An Historian's View,” Strategic 
Review, Spring 1999; “Military Culture Matters,” Strategic 
Review, Summer 1999; and "Military Experimentation in the 
Interwar Period," Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 2000. At present 
besides working as a defense consultant in Washington, Murray is 
working on a book dealing with the ability of military institutions 
to adapt to the challenging conditions of combat.  
When American forces took over Saddam Hussein's palaces and 
ministries during the invasion of 2003, they also captured all of 
Iraq's government documents. Although these documents shed 
light on many features of Saddam's regime and the events that 
transpired in the region during his rule, U.S. government officials 
have paid surprisingly little attention to them.  
Williamson Murray, professor emeritus of history at The Ohio 
State University, argues that ignoring Saddam's government 
documents has been a serious mistake. Murray is part of a team 
of scholars at the U.S. Naval Academy engaged in translating 
these documents from Arabic and making them available in the 
National Archives.  
As official products of the Iraqi bureaucracy, Williamson says, 
these government documents not only contain many unknown 
details about the nature of Saddam's regime and its policies, but 
also might have helped the United States bolster its case for war 
and its legal case against Saddam Hussein for war crimes. It is 
also useful to understand the Iraqi perspective, both from a 
theoretical and practical perspective, and how events are 
perceived on the “other side of the hill.”  
Williamson described some of the considerable difficulties his 
team has encountered in translating the Iraqi government 
documents – difficulties that he said illustrate the universal 
incompetence of bureaucracy. First, the military and political 
organizations of the Iraqi government and Baath Party produced 
a great deal of useless propaganda. Second, the U.S. 
bureaucracy argued that the United States did not own these 
documents, and the question had to be sorted out before the 
team's translation work could continue.  
Although much of the Iraqi material is sheer propaganda whose 
sole aim is to exalt Saddam as a brilliant leader universally loved 
and respected by the people of his country, other documents give 
valuable insight into Saddam's regime and his policies. In this 
way, Williamson said, the documents help us glean the Iraqi 
regime's view of the external world and its true intentions at 
critical junctures.  
One key insight concerns Saddam's military preparation on the 
eve of the Iraq war. The documents make clear that Iraqi leaders 
expected not a U.S. invasion but a major counter-insurgency. 
The United States, they thought, was afraid to fight Iraq directly, 
but instead preferred to instigate rebellion. Iraq's reasons for 
believing this went back to the first Gulf War in 1991, when the 
United States fell short of not only marching all the way to the 
capital city, Baghdad, but also of entering the Basra region in 
1991. Instead, the US chose to instigate Shi'ite rebellions, which 
in fact nearly brought down Saddam's regime. Thus, Iraqi leaders 
feared a similar serious rebellion in 2003, and one that could 
erupt simultaneously in many provinces, and with disastrous 
consequences for the regime.  
To meet this perceived internal threat, Iraq strengthened local 
Baath organizations militarily. The local armed forces would 
function to prevent a rebellion before it grew and spread rather 
than engage in fighting foreign invasion. In fact, Saddam's fear 
of a coup or resurrection was so great that he made sure no 
connections were in place between these local armed forces, so 
that they could not band together in a coup against him. Thus, 
after the U.S. invasion, an insurgency emerged in Iraq against 
U.S. occupation not because these forces were connected, but in 
fact because they were very disconnected.  
The Iraqi government documents showed how out of touch 
Saddam was in reading not only U.S. power but any outside 
power and global events that transpired. Because the United 
States did not commit ground forces against Serbia during the 
Kosovo crisis, the Iraqi regime concluded that the United States 
not a real superpower, but a paper tiger. And because the reward 
for telling the truth under Saddam's regime was often death, 
Iraqi military officers were highly reluctant to report the gravity 
of their situation. As a result, Iraqis insisted they were winning 
the war as late as April 2003 and even decided against seeking a 
ceasefire at the United Nations.  
Documents also show that the Iraqi regime was ignorant of 
history, Williamson said. Every adverse development in the 
history of the Middle East was attributed to an international 
Jewish conspiracy. The regime was also ruthless against 
dissidents, opponents and anyone who dared not to accept its 
version of events and history. In this way, Saddam held fractious 
society together, albeit with force and fear.  
The Iraqi regime strove above all to establish its leadership in the 
Arab world, Williamson said. According to the Iraqi government 
documents, one of Saddam's main motivations for Iraq's 
ferocious war with Iran was to gain prestige in the eyes of Arabs. 
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After the campaign in the east, Saddam planned to turn west and 
create a unified Arab world. Saddam believed that a unified Arab 
world would be as strong as the United States and achieve 
superpower status on the world stage. However, things did not 
go according to Saddam's plan: Iraq's war against Iran did not 
end in victory and the Arabs failed to rally around Iraq.  
Another result of Saddam's Arab unification policy was the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is generally seen as 
an attempt by Saddam to fix his finances. But Williamson said 
that Iraqi official documents show Saddam was in fact actively 
seeking a confrontation with the United States because he 
thought America would be defeated and hence forced to quit the 
Middle East. In fact, at the end of 1991, though it may seem 
bizarre, the Iraqis were under the impression that they had stood 
up to the United States and won.  
In sum, Williamson said, the Iraqi official documents reveal the 
full extent of Saddam's megalomania, his regime's utter lack of 
grasp of reality and its poor reading of history. The documents 
also provide insight into Saddam's reliance on fear and 
repression as a means of maintaining power. With regard to 
foreign policy, they help us understand the true intentions behind 
Saddam's seemingly provocative actions.  
But, Williamson said, on perhaps the most important question – 
whether Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction – the 
documents are ambiguous. One problem is the nature of the 
regime. Even if Iraq didn't have WMDs, Iraqi leaders often spoke 
as if they did. The Iraqi documents show that because of U.N. 
inspections, Saddam's regime was engaged in destroying WMDs 
in the 1990s, and it is now clear that the regime did not possess 
WMDs on the eve of the U.S. invasion. But the Iraqi documents 
also show Saddam intended to acquire WMDs once sanctions 
against Iraq came to an end, a potential threat to the United 
States and the region.  
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